POW/MIA 2/8/01 IMPORTANT!!!!!!From: "Bruce K Melson" <email@example.com>
> ITEM OF INTEREST: Seattle, Washington 2/07/01
> > Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi,
> > Dennis G. Harter will be visiting Seattle, WA on
> > February 28, 2001. The Veterans of the Vietnam War,
> > Department of Washington is one of the entities
> > involved in organizing this event in conjunction with
> > another Vietnamese community organization. In March
> > 1999, when Mr. Harter previously visited, he came very
> > well prepared with answers to many questions written
> > and verbal (not that they were fully responsive), and
> > restatements of US policy on Vietnam. It appeared
> > that he and his staff also see alot of Vietnam related
> > materials on the internet, which may may be why he was
> > prepared for virtually all questions on human rights,
> > POW-MIA, and refugee immigration matters. Does anyone
> > have a detailed POW-MIA matter they wish to raise with
> > sufficient background information so that perhaps a
> > written response could be elicited from Harter or even
> > Peterson at the Embassy in Hanoi? Please send a faxed
> > letter addressed to:
> > Mr. Dennis G. Harter
> > Deputy Chief of Mission
> > U.S. Embassy
> > Hanoi, Vietnam
> > C/O Veterans of the Vietnam War, Dept. of WA
> > Nicholas Rock
> > State Commander, Department of Washington
> > Veterans of the Vietnam War (VVnW)
> > 1916 Pike Place, #12, #616
> > Seattle, WA 98101-1097
> > TEL/FAX: (425) 489-8316
> > E-MAIL: firstname.lastname@example.org
> > Transcript of interview #S(FORBES #93)
> > Following are the raw transcripts of an on-camera interview conducted in
> > 1998 with Bui Tin for "SECRETS OF WAR."
> > Please keep in mind that these transcripts are truly "raw" and thus have not
> > been edited or checked for spelling and accuracy.
> > ----------------------------------------------------
> > All rights reserved.
> > © 1998 The Documedia Group.
> > Overview Tape #93 (BUI TIN)
> > As an insider, high-up official in the North Vietnamese government during
> > the war, Bui Tin sheds some light on what strategies the North Vietnamese
> > government employs to fight and defeat its enemies: South Vietnamese troops
> > and particularly American troops. How an army with limited resources and
> > weapons can defeat its enemy, which is equipped with almost unlimited
> > resources and advanced weapons. What is the secret? Bui Tin also gives the
> > viewers his reflections of the war, his present views of the government:
> > what the government fails to accomplish after the war and in the mean time.
> > Finally his hope for Vietnam and political as well as economic changes that
> > are much needed.
> > 1. 1:21
> > It's the question that President Ford and General Westmoreland have asked
> > me: what American could have done to avoid heavy losses in the Vietnamese
> > war. And General Westmoreland also has asked me if American use ground
> > troops to attack the Ho Chi Minh's trail, what could have been its effect on
> > the war. [1.56] Now that the war has ended for over more than 20 years, I
> > can give my best answers to these questions. I have a chance to discuss
> > these same questions with General Vo Nguyen Giap on our trip to the East
> > Germany and Hungary back in 1977. [2.20] According to Giap, at that time
> > the North Vietnamese leaders have grave concerns about this; they are scared
> > with the possibility that American troops may land and attack at certain
> > places. [2.40] If American brings in 2 or 3 divisions to Quang Tri and
> > Quang Binh or some part of Ha Tinh, it will cause us many troubles. [2.53]
> > First of all, our effort in transporting weapons to the South will be
> > disrupted. Secondly, a large portion of our fighting soldiers have to
> > remain in the North to defense ourselves; e it is our priority to defense
> > the North since this is where our resources and headquarters are located.
> > However, for some reason American chooses not to do so. [3.19] If American
> > ground troops attack the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they could destroy our many our
> > complex infrastructures and fighting resources set up along the trail. Back
> > then I meet Dong Si Nguyen who is the overall commander of Ho Chi Minh
> > Trail; Nguyen admits this same concerns: [4.10] If American ground troops
> > attack, our effort in moving supplies and troops to the South will greatly
> > suffer.
> > 2. 4:30
> > About our communication system, it works like this: [4.55] In the beginning
> > when fighting takes place at small scale, each of our fighting units just
> > follows a certain given outline and proceeds with the fighting on its own.
> > [5.20] Later on when radio communication equipment of different capacities
> > become available and the fighting scale gets bigger, we use them for sending
> > instructions and receiving reports in different ranges from 4, 5 km to 40 or
> > 50 km; it varies and depends on the equipment. [5.40] Communications at
> > higher command levels such as divisions can reach Hanoi for direct contact
> > with Central Command Staff. [5.50] Wired communications are also
> > established in certain places for fear of signal interception and
> > information leaking.
> > 3. 6:20
> > To summarize the strategies we employ, I can say about two main points.
> > [6.33] First, we avoid engaging in any overall fight extended days after
> > days or months after months involving different kind of troops and weapons
> > with layers of plan - the conventional way of war fighting, for which
> > American are very good, well prepared. [6.50] We force our enemy to fight
> > in a way appropriate for us, not for them. We want American troops eat
> > their foods not with knives, spoons, and folks, but with chopsticks for
> > which we are very good at. This means we deny American the chances to use
> > their advanced air fighters, numerous weapons, and abundant supplies.
> > [7.35] Secondly, we engage them in guerilla warfare, and we organize our
> > army in the conventional way but for the purpose of guerilla way of
> > fighting. [7.53] We plan our fights quick and short - from 5, 10 minutes to
> > half an hour, then we stop and disappear. [8.08] This is also the way we
> > fight and defense us against American fighters and bombers in North Vietnam.
> > Even though, 50 or 60 American airplanes come in to attack, we only send out
> > 1, 2, or at most 4 fighters to counter them, and we do it quick and short -
> > from takeoff to landing should take us 2 to 7 minutes. [8.42] We avoid any
> > long dog fight, for which American are well trained and good at. And in the
> > South, even when the fighting involves a great number of our troops, we do
> > the same - quick and short. We call this guerrilla warfare, but we still
> > organize our army in the conventional way.
> > 4. 9:45
> > About our experience with helicopters, I must say helicopters cause us a lot
> > of troubles and put us in a bad position for the reason that they can come
> > at any time from nowhere. [10.06] We lose many troops and personnel because
> > of helicopters. Definitely American hold the high ground on this. But then
> > we adapt ourselves to helicopters by spreading the troops out and by
> > deception; we give them false indications of our whereabouts, but the main
> > thing is spreading the troops out. Later on we are equipped with
> > anti-aircraft missiles, so we use them for counter attack or take advantage
> > of forest, mountain, caves, and other natural setting to hide ourselves.
> > 5. 11:28
> > I meet Harold Moore, chief commander at Pleimer. [11.39] The battle at
> > Pleimer is our first direct fight with American. Before that battle we are
> > always worried of the facts that American is a superpower, and their
> > soldiers are bodily bigger, stronger, and taller than our. But right after
> > that battle, we come to the conclusion that we can deal with American, even
> > a strong belief that we can defeat them. Our Chief Commander in the South,
> > General Nguyen Chi Thanh puts it this way "we can deal with American if we
> > do it the right way." [12.53] So what is the right way? First, we have to
> > figure out American's way of fighting, their logic, and their approach to
> > battle. For example, we have to make our prediction as to how American will
> > react to this situation or that condition; from that we will draw our own
> > plan in advance, then train and instruct our troops so they can make
> > appropriate decisions in battle field. [13.36] Secondly, we will hide and
> > cover our troops with great care so we can ambush, launch surprise attack
> > next to them and make quick withdrawal. General Thanh instructs the troops:
> > "Stay close to the enemy and fight." Fighting like this demands us a lot, a
> > lot in mobility, but that is the way we plan our fight.
> > 6. 14:30
> > We suffer great loss, lose of human lives in the millions, but we keep
> > fighting for many reasons. [14.53] For one, it is part of our history and
> > heritage. We have been fighting our traditional enemy from the North for
> > thousands of year, so fighting gets into our bone and blood; it is as long
> > as our history. [15.11] Second, we just finish a long fight against French;
> > from it we master our fighting skill, learn to organize. It lays the
> > groundwork for us to continue the war against American. We stand ready to
> > rally our people for support and enlist our young men. [15.40] Third, our
> > people have great love for their motherland; they are ready to make the
> > sacrifice because of their country; we convince our people that the victory
> > against American is for real, inevitable. We also benefit from the world's
> > opinion and support. [16.17] And lastly, I must say it is our totalitarian
> > system of government. We have no choice in such a system, no turning back.
> > We have only one choice that is to go ahead with the war keeping our
> > commitment unchanged.
> > 7. 17:17
> > About our troops, most of them are members of the Communist Party, so they
> > belong to a system and work within the system. The Party Central Committee
> > has total control over the arm force, the army, and this arrangement is
> > observed by all ranks of our army. As for accusation that our army soldiers
> > exercise brutality against our own people, there is a need for distinction.
> > In wartime, brutality is something unavoidable. Our army is the people's
> > army; they love people and serve their cause. But because they are also
> > trained for social class struggle ideology; therefore, murdering South
> > Vietnam officers and people in villages and cities takes place. It is
> > unavoidable during wartime. [19.25] Now look at the Phoenix Program, I ask
> > Mr. Cobby (?), Director of this program and learn that the program kills
> > about 15,000 and captures about 20,000 people who are civilians, farmer who
> > follow us in the fight against American. In wartime it happens, I feel sad
> > that this causes great human losses and suffering for people.
> > 8. 21:10
> > Let me put the answer this way. If I am in charge and command a number of
> > soldiers and there is report that my soldiers mistreat people. [21.24] Now
> > if this is necessary for us to be cruel, as demanded from a higher level of
> > command, in order to eliminate people affiliated with the enemy, I would say
> > it is some thing we do in order to win the war. [21.51] I would never let
> > my soldiers do bad things and make people suffer. I would investigate, pay
> > people for the damage, and discipline my soldiers where appropriate. If
> > cruelty happens as a result of eliminating those who are against us, we just
> > carry out the necessary thing to win.
> > 9. 22:35
> > [22.50] About the question whether this is a civil war - brothers killing
> > brothers. [23.02] I have two different ways of understanding this war at
> > two different times in my life. [23.10] During the war I have a very
> > simple, clear understanding of the war: it is for our country's
> > independence against a foreign invader and those who are behind this
> > invader. [23.24] But in recent years, I think more about this and come to
> > the understanding that this is an ideological warfare being casted into a
> > civil war. [24.38] It represents the war between two opposite worlds:
> > communism vs. Western democracy. [23.55] Since back then the world is
> > divided into two sides; one is led by American, the other by Soviet Union.
> > As a result of the world's history and situation, North Vietnam ends up in
> > the Soviet side and South Vietnam belongs to American side. [24.16] So I
> > now see us as victims of the world's historical events; and we end up
> > fighting against ourselves. Recently, I write a book asking our people to
> > resolve our differences and make peace with ourselves.
> > 10. 24:55
> > Concerning our experience with bomber B-52, just hearing about the bomber
> > scares us, but direct experience makes us less fearful. [25.31] The more
> > experience we have, the less fear we get. [25.22] Why so? Because the
> > bombing occurs in a straight line; therefore, we can avoid it by staying to
> > either side of this straight line. We can be safe by hiding in dugout
> > holes. So I can say that B-52 bombing have not that great an effect on the
> > fighting because its effect is intimidation or dampens our fighting spirit.
> > [26.00] And I can say the number of our soldiers get killed by B-52 in
> > battlefields is less than that of our civilians who live in the North near
> > Hai Phong.
> > 11. 27:10
> > We have many ways to cover and hide our troops. [27.20] First, we use
> > forest, mountain, and cave. Second, we keep moving, many times to many
> > places even within one day. Third, we confuse our enemy about where we are
> > by deception, like cooking in open fire, letting the smoke rise up at one
> > place, but staying at another one. We also mislead our enemy about our
> > position through radio communication so they can not find us.
> > 12. 28:50
> > We mater our natural surroundings and make plan in advance. We try to
> > predict how our enemy will react if we make our move this way or that way.
> > [24.20] It turns out that we are very successful with this because American
> > troops also follow certain pre-determined rules.
> > 13. 29:40
> > Talking about American's combat skills, it varies from unit to unit. Some
> > are very good and very determined to fight while others are not that great
> > and inconsistent. [30.00] Compared to French troops, I find Americans are
> > not as highly motivated and skillful. I myself have previous fighting
> > experience with Senegal and Moroccan soldiers who fight in the French army
> > and make my comparison. [30.29] I think the main reason is that many
> > American soldiers come over here and fight for one or two and go home; they
> > are not professional soldiers. [30.43] The pilots come and complete, say
> > 100 sorties and are done with. [31.00] Another reason, I can say many of
> > them don't understand the purpose of this war; they can't rationalize the
> > cause.
> > 14. 31:20
> > About knowing our enemy, this is a must for us for the reason that we, a
> > small country with limited resources, are fighting against a superpower with
> > advanced weapons and numerous resources. We study very hard the details of
> > every battle we have with them and draw some conclusions out of that, then
> > we send people out to share these information with our troops as fast as we
> > can in order to better prepare our troops for their next fight. It is our
> > firm belief that we must know our enemy in order to defeat them.
> > 15. 33:52
> > To answer the question how we justify the death of millions of people, I
> > have this to say: we justify this loss out of the belief that the
> > independence for our country will justify the loss. [33.28] For the
> > survival of our people, we don't put a limit on the number of human lives
> > being lost; independence is the most precious thing we must have. [33.45]
> > As for American, I think this is a great loss for them. [34.20] Out of this
> > big loss of human lives, I have only one big regret: our Communist Party
> > leaders fail to seize the historical opportunity to reconcile our people and
> > bring posterity to the country. [34.38] As a result, after the war ends,
> > our country goes through 10 years of darkness in poverty and degradation;
> > people loss their human rights, their freedom of speech; we have political
> > prisoners.
> > 16. 35:27
> > After the war, we go through 10 years in darkness, not until 1986 the
> > Communist Party starts making changes. However, we change without any plan,
> > any architecture, like Deng Xiao Ping (?) of China. [35.51] We change
> > without planning - change out of desperation and for the sake of change. We
> > change only halfway: changing the economic system without changing the
> > political system. [36.02] Now it is the end of 1997, and we find ourselves
> > in middle of the road, middle of our crisis wondering whether we continue or
> > we stop changing. [36.12] The Communist Party is the main obstacle to the
> > progress of our country.
> > 17. 36:32
> > I join the arm force at about the time when the August Revolution takes
> > place. I am very young at the time, about 18 or 19 years old when I join
> > the Communist Party in March 1946. I do it because of my youth and my
> > enthusiasm; [37.12] I have knowledge about neither Marxism nor Leninism.
> > Because there is only one Communist Party in Vietnam therefore many people
> > join this party out of the love for their motherland. [37.27] Later on I
> > find out that the Communist Party does lead us to victory in the war, but on
> > the negative side the party adopts a foreign ideology and applies it
> > mechanically, thus brings about many failures. [37.55] About my wartime
> > experience, I am active at Binh Tri Thien against the French in 1946 and
> > 1947. [38.11] Later I participate in a limited way at Dien Bien Phu as a
> > low ranking officer, but I am very proud of my little contribution to the
> > victory for all of us. [38.28] During the war against American, I make
> > several trips to the South, then become a journalist and participate to the
> > fight in rallying people and cheering up soldiers. [38.40] I never regret
> > anything because I do everything by my conscience. [38.47] But now I feel
> > very ashamed of the Communist Party, because they have the name and the
> > opportunity to lead the country, but fail to bring progress and posterity to
> > our country and fail to make our country to catch up with other countries.
> > They lead us going backward; our people are suffering; in the countryside
> > they are revolting at Dong Nai, at Thai Binh. Presently government bribery
> > and corruption are very widespread. [39.23] I am longing that all my fellow
> > Vietnamese inside and outside the country work together to build a
> > pluralistic and democratic governing system and to end this totalitarian
> > system of government so all our people's energy and resources can be put to
> > good use in respect of Vietnam's heroic past.
> > 18. 40:15
> > Saying so is not correct about the Tet Offensive, there are American studies
> > saying that happens we go ahead with this offensive out of desperation. It
> > doesn't happen like that; we make plan in Hanoi to catch American off guard,
> > especially after General Westmoreland tells American Congress that American
> > troops success in chasing Viet Cong out of the South and we are very weak,
> > exhausted. [40.52] It is just precisely at this point we plan an all out
> > attack to the whole 43 provinces in the South. And we succeed with this
> > plan; we attack everywhere in the South, all cities and all villages. We
> > still fight in a guerilla style in but in grand scale of planning and
> > attacking.
> > 19. 41:17
> > The result is we win, not only militarily but also, most important, in
> > public opinion and the position for our peace negotiation effort. Right
> > after that, American agrees starting the peace talk in Paris.
> > 20. 41:39
> > Now about how I come to know Ho Chi Minh. Around the time of the August
> > Revolution, Ho Chi Minh asks my father to become Speaker of The House for
> > the newly formed Congress of Viet Nam Democratic Republic; and that lasts
> > from 1946 to 1955. My father and HCM know each other because they exchange
> > poetry with each other. [42.15] Back then, I regard Ho as gigantic leader,
> > but later on I realize he has his own success, he is patriotic, but he also
> > bears great responsibility for installing a socialist system using Stalin
> > style and building up an oppressive and totalitarian government in Vietnam.
> > [42.40] It is a regrettable thing about his life, his negative side. I hope
> > the young generation will judge people in our history based on facts, good
> > or bad.
> > 21. 43:14
> > As far as I know the Tet Offensive proceeds through 3 phases: the First in
> > January, the Second in May, and the Thirst in September. [43.15] Back then,
> > as General Giap sees it the First phase is enough; it means we need to
> > preserve our strength for a prolonged fight. [43.34] But others see the
> > success as their own glory and push for the Second and Third phases of
> > offences; it is these later two phases of offences cause us tremendous
> > losses; many of our infrastructures get wiped out. [44.06] It takes us many
> > years to regain our strength, not until 1972 we are able to launch another
> > offence. I think that is our only mistake after the Tet Offensive.
> > 22. 44:38
> > As for General Giap's opinion at that time, he loses his influence because
> > there is a ferocious fight within the party between Le Duan and Vo Nguyen
> > Giap. Le Duan and Le Duc Tho suspect and accuse Giap being an agent for
> > Soviet Union; therefore all of Giap's subordinates get apprehended like Dang
> > Kien Giang, Nguyen Vi, Le Lien, and many others; they get dismissed,
> > demoted, or put in prison. [45.32] In a memoir I just receive in the last
> > few days, written by Tran Quynh, former secretary for Le Duan and later on
> > Vice Prime Minister. [45.50] This memoir gets circulated in Ha Noi and has
> > the purpose to discredit General Giap; it does have some things, which
> > actually happen back then. [46.05] For example, there is a decision to
> > remove Giap from the Party Central Committee, but Le Duan saves Giap for
> > fear that removing Giap will lead to Soviet Union's cutting off support for
> > the war effort. But at the same time Le Duan wants to send Giap the message
> > that, "You deserve to be removed from the Party Central Committee, but I
> > save you." From that point on, Giap always treats Le Duan in fear and
> > respect. [46.42] I personally observe and see this when I make a trip with
> > Giap 1977 to East Germany, Hungary, and China to express our gratitude to
> > these countries in their effort to support us during the war. Giap always
> > holds Le Duan in high regard and reminds me to report to Le Duan that the
> > leaders of these countries respect Le Duan for his great effort and
> > capability during the war.
> > 23. 48:00
> > Right after the Tet Offensive 1968, I have no idea about the extent of our
> > loss. Not until much later, say the beginning of 1969 when our
> > representatives from the South come and report in Ha Noi. [48.19] I come to
> > the realization that our loss after three phases of offences - the January,
> > the May, and the September - are gravely serious. [48.32] American Army and
> > South Vietnamese Army counter attack and destroy all the works we spend 10
> > to 20 years to build up. We can not enlist troops from the South any more;
> > we have to send in our own troops from the North. All our infra structures
> > in the South get wiped out, [49.06] and now the North has to bear the total
> > cost for the war effort in the South. I am telling you, the loss is so
> > horrible.
> > 24. 49:34
> > On the surface, there are two armies: one from the North Vietnam Republic,
> > one from the South Vietnam Liberation Front. And two governments: one from
> > the North, one from the South. [50.10] But in reality, we are confirmed
> > that there is only party, one army, one system of leadership, and one red
> > flag with a yellow star. [50.30] Right after signing the Paris Peace Treaty
> > in 1973, I arrive at Tan Son Nhat Airport in Saigon as a Spokesman for North
> > Vietnam Delegates. [50.50] During daytime conference we raise up two
> > different flags representing two different governments and two different
> > armies, but at nighttime when we hold our own meeting, I confirm to everyone
> > that there is only one party, one army, and one flag. [51.05] And as
> > everyone can see it, after 1975, the South Vietnam Liberation Front
> > Government just disappears without any fanfares; no one hears about them any
> > longer and no one sees the flag once representing them. [51.25] As for the
> > people who once represent this government, they now feel very bitter for
> > what happens to them - they are people like Huynh Tan Phat or chairman
> > Nguyen Huu Tho, etc. [51.48] They are neither a part of the Communist Party
> > nor its governing body. [51.56] This says something about the Communist
> > Party; they centralize all the power for themselves. They take away not the
> > rights of everyone but also the rights of someone who are created for the
> > party itself.
> > 25. 52:23
> > You ask me if this surprises me? Anyone who lives with an oppressive,
> > totalitarian government must not find this surprising; anything can happen
> > with such a government. This is a tough lesson for me to learn.
> > 26. 52:56
> > About the Phoenix Program, I have met Mr. Cornby (?), Director of CIA and
> > exchanged information with him. [53.10] It hurts me a lot to know that a
> > big number of people, up to 20,000 being captured and up to 16,000 being
> > killed. I think these are civilians, farmers who love the country, believe
> > in the cause, and support the war to liberate their homeland. Their lives
> > have been destroyed, and I deeply feel pitiful for them. [53.53] Now that I
> > am not content with this totalitarian government, I think these people are
> > victims of a civil war created as result of the world's historic situation.
> > [54.11] And the Communist Party has its share of responsibility because it
> > imports a foreign ideology promoting social class struggling as a rule,
> > embracing cruelty, and creating war. Of course war happens because there
> > are many sides participating. [54.37] But I think the Communist Party bears
> > heavy responsibility for the loss of many humane lives, and this loss
> > doesn't bring about freedom and posterity for our people.
> > End....
> > Starbulletin.com <http://starbulletin.com/2001/02/06/news/masthead.gif>
> > _____
> > Tuesday, February 6, 2001
> > http://starbulletin.com/2001/02/06/news/artf.jpg
> > <http://starbulletin.com/2001/02/06/news/artf.jpg>
> > Associated Press
> > United States servicemen salute and drape the nation's flag over
> > a casket containing the remains of an American soldier during a
> > repatriation ceremony at Phnom Penh airport in Cambodia today.
> > The remains were found on Koh Tang island off the southern
> > coast of Cambodia, where U.S. teams have been searching for
> > the remains of 18 American servicemen believed killed
> > at the end of the Vietnam war in 1975.
> > _____
> > In from Gary P. GParker265@aol.com
> > U.S. Remains Coming From Cambodia
> > .c The Associated Press
> > PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP) - U.S. officials on Tuesday sent back to the
> > United States what are believed to be the remains of one of the last
> > American
> > soldiers killed in combat during the Vietnam War era.
> > More than 150 people attended a solemn ceremony at the airport of the
> > Cambodian capital where a box containing the remains was covered in a U.S.
> > flag and loaded onto a plane to be sent to an Army laboratory in Hawaii for
> > positive identification.
> > It could take a year or more for the remains to be identified and the
> > victim's family informed.
> > The remains were located by a team of about 50 Americans and Cambodians
> > last week on Tang Island, off the Cambodian coast in the Gulf of Thailand.
> > The U.S. lost 18 servicemen in a battle there in May 1975 when three
> > helicopters went in to rescue the crew of a civilian cargo vessel captured
> > by
> > Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, which had taken over the country the previous month.
> > The island was much better defended than U.S. intelligence reports had
> > indicated, and the civilian crew of the merchant ship Mayaguez was not even
> > on the island when the attack took place. The debacle was the last U.S.
> > combat engagement in Cambodia or Vietnam.
> > The remains are thought to be of a combatant killed early in the May 1975
> > battle. U.S. forces were prevented by heavy Khmer Rouge fire from retrieving
> > his body, U.S. Ambassador Kent Wiedemann said.
> > Richard Wills, the excavation team's chief anthropologist, confirmed that a
> > Khmer Rouge veteran had pointed out the spot where the U.S. serviceman
> > was buried. The remains were recovered one day before the end of a one-month
> > search and excavation mission.
> > Wiedemann said at the airport ceremony that it was a day of ``pride and
> > gratification,'' describing the deaths of U.S. servicemen in the region as
> > being for a noble cause.
> > Warfare pitting U.S.-assisted governments against communist insurgents in
> > Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam ended in 1975 with communi
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